mens sana in corpore sano

from Tarrying With The Negative (1993):

What is lost thereby is the topological discord between the form “I think” and the substance which thinks, i.e., the distinction between the analytical proposition on the identity of the logical subject of thought, contained in “I think,” and the synthetical proposition on the identity of a *person* qua thinking thing-substance. By articulating this distinction, Kant logically *precedes* Descartes: he brings to light a kind of “vanishing mediator,” a moment which has to disappear if the Cartesian *res cogitans* is to emerge (CPR, A 354-56). This Kantian distinction is revived by Lacan in the guise of the distinction between the subject of the enunciation (*sujet de l’énonciation*) and the subject of the enunciated (*sujet de l’énoncé*): the Lacanian subject of the enunciation ($) is also an empty, nonsubstantial logical variable (not function), whereas the subject of the enunciated (the “person”) consists of the fantasmatic “stuff” which fills out the void of $.

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